Drug Policy in the CARICOM Caribbean

Axel Klein[1] and Marcus Day[2]

Introduction

The Caribbean region is a place of both production and consumption of drugs (cannabis, alcohol), but drug control measures have largely been shaped by the transit of South American cocaine to North American and European markets. Policies have therefore been imposed by external powers and often reflect shifts in foreign and development policy. In turn, the operation of organised crime groups has posed a threat to security reflected in rising homicide rates, gang violence, and deteriorating levels of public safety. By cooperating with external partners and donors, Caribbean states have initiated repressive policies with serious repercussions on state-society relations. Because of the overall burden that policing and adjudicating drug offences has placed on national resources, and the direct involvement of corrupt members of the criminal justice system in drug trafficking, these policies are posing a threat to the legitimacy of Caribbean states. Questions of social justice and governance are subordinated to the practicalities of program implementation because Caribbean drug control has been largely subcontracted to international agencies. Indeed, this paper tracks how organisational interests play a prominent feature in the policy design.

The crucible for these tensions between governments and society is the cannabis debate, because, for large sections of the population across the region, cannabis has become normalised and socially integrated. Yet government agencies, encouraged, funded, and equipped by foreign powers to combat cocaine trafficking, turn their capacity instead against domestic cannabis users, traders, and growers. Protesting voices have long been calling for alternative approaches, only to be silenced by international agencies and funders. In recent years, with Latin American heads of state calling for a policy review, bold legislative changes in Uruguay, and the regulation of cannabis markets in two US states, Caribbean leaders are again looking at cannabis policy. Policy makers are once again considering cannabis decriminalisation in Jamaica and at the regional level. This article provides a political context to the contemporary debates grounded in the history of drug control in the region.

 

An Unprecedented Threat

Nothing poses greater threats to civil society in CARICOM countries than the drug problem; and nothing exemplifies the powerlessness of regional governments more. That is the magnitude of the danger of drug abuse and drug trafficking hold for our community. It is a many-layered danger. At base is the human destruction implicit in drug addiction; but implicit also is the corruption of individuals and systems by the sheer enormity of the inducements of the illegal drug trade in poor countries. On top of this lie the implications for governance itself – at the hands of both external agencies engaged in international interdiction, and the drug barons themselves – the dons of the modern Caribbean – who threaten governance from within. (Ramphal, 1993)

 

On October 9th 2013, lawmakers in the Jamaican parliament approved a private members’ motion to decriminalize the possession and use of ganja, as marijuana is known on the island. During the debate, MPs stressed two points: ganja is deeply rooted in the culture, and the penalty of a criminal record for offenders is not warranted by the potentially harmful effect of the drug. Given the high level of prevalence of ganja consumption in Jamaica, the ubiquity of cannabis on offer, and the vocal advocacy by the country’s cultural ambassadors¾first and foremost, Bob Marley¾many foreign observers find it surprising that cannabis is prohibited at all. Jamaica is, however, a country with one of the oldest prohibitions dating back to 1913, and thousands of Jamaicans are fined or imprisoned for cannabis-related offences annually (UNODC, 2011). Of the 6,150 Jamaicans convicted at the Corporate Area Resident Magistrate’s Court over the first six months of 2013, 71% had committed drug-related offences (Gleaner, 2013).

The decision by lawmakers to give legal sanction to the social reality of widespread cannabis use closes a chapter on a political initiative that began in 2000, with the formation of the Jamaica Ganja Commission. Comprising independent experts and community stakeholders, the commission studied the scientific evidence on cannabis harms, looked at different models for the regulation of the drug, and held a series of public meetings throughout the country. Its recommendations were to decriminalize ganja for private and personal use among adults. It was felt that the social, economic, and political costs of enforcing a ban for which there was only very limited support caused more harm than good. According to the head of the Commission, Professor Barry Chevannes, “Jamaica’s dilemma lies in maintaining a colonial order in a postcolonial state; a task that demands repression and must undermine the moral foundation of the state” (Chevannes, 2004).

Within hours of its publication, the US ambassador Michael Keplosvky warned the Jamaican government of the forthcoming narcotics certification review and its consequences for Jamaica. Each year the US State Department assesses the performance of transit and producer countries in cooperating with US drug control efforts (Klein, 2001). Penalties for countries whose drug control regime are not considered sufficient include loss of US development assistance, trading privileges, and access to loans from international lending institutions. The recommendations of the Ganja Commission were shelved, and political debate moved on. Such interventions in domestic affairs highlight the limitations on self-determination in the post- colonial Caribbean, where nominally sovereign states are highly dependent on the political goodwill of the hemispheric hegemony, on trade and tourist flows, and on development assistance.

Caribbean drug policy, the loose regulatory framework first imposed during the colonial era, is, to a large extent, determined by the demands and obsessions of the great powers. Far and away, this means the US, which has been chasing traffickers and eradicating crops in the region since the 1970s. But the EU, France, the Netherlands, and the UK also actively support national and regional institutions, and run supply reduction operations and training exercises. In the Eastern Caribbean, therefore, drug policy has first and foremost been an international relations issue, followed by questions of security and, as a poor third, public health.

 

Security Challenges Faced by the Small Island States of the Eastern Caribbean

On the eve of independence from Britain, the countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean (the British Virgin Islands, The Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, the Turks and Caicos Islands, Jamaica, Trinidad, Montserrat, Anguilla, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Kitts, Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago, Dominica, Barbados, Belize, and Guyana) entertained the idea of a federal state, before most opted for sovereign status.[3]  Recognising the difficulty of meeting all the functions of government with the limited resources of mini- and microstates, they agreed to pool capacities and create a free trade area by founding the Caribbean Free Trade Area (CFTA). The functions of CFTA were absorbed into the Caribbean Community and Market (CARICOM) by the Treaty of Chaguaramas, 1973[4]. In addition to trade, shared endeavours, included regional standardisation and adaption of educational proficiency examinations originating in the United Kingdom, agricultural research, and public health measures. The portfolio of the CARICOM secretariat in Georgetown, Guyana has been growing steadily and is now supported by both member states’ contributions and development cooperation funds; most importantly, from the European Union. It has included new non-Commonwealth members, such as Suriname and Haiti, a country with a population larger than all the original founders combined. Despite these new admissions, CARICOM remains a very Anglophone club. In between these English-speaking countries and territories are the islands of Aruba, Bonaire, Curacao, and St. Martin with different associations with the Netherlands, as well as the French département d’outre-mer (DOM) of Guadeloupe, Martinique, and French Guyana.[5]

Because of the resource constraints of individual island states, cooperation is critical.  In 1982, the members of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines) and Barbados formed the Regional Security System.[6] Operating a number of patrol vessels, reconnaissance planes, and an army unit, the RSS today depends on US and EU support for half of its funding. Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) and Jamaica each maintain independent security forces, with some capacity to project power to neighbouring islands. The armed forces of T&T helped restore order in Grenada in the aftermath of Hurricane Ivan in 2005, and the Jamaican Defence Force provided humanitarian aid to Haiti after the earthquake of 2010. Yet, the constraints on the capacity of island states to impose control was demonstrated by the violence surrounding the arrest of the drug trafficker Christopher Michael Coke, also known as Dudus, in Kingston, Jamaica in 2010. This leader of the drug trafficking gang “shower posse,” wanted for extradition to the US, had holed up in the district of Tivoli Gardens with his armed supporters and resisted attempts by the security forces to arrest him for five days. Close to a hundred 72 civilians were killed by police and one police killed during the standoff, with over 500 arrested and many more injured. This event exposed  the weakness of the government to enforce its own laws.

This security dilemma has both geographical and political components. The islands of the Lesser Antilles, stretching from Trinidad and Tobago in the south to the Bahamas in the north, serve as stepping-stones, linking the estuary of the Orinoco in Venezuela to the Florida Keys. Guns flow south along this route, and cocaine flows north to the USA and Canada and across the Atlantic to Europe and Africa. The earnings generated by involvement in the trade outstrip government revenue, which can leave traffickers and their gangs better armed than the security services. Moreover, there is often a close relationship between traffickers and politicians. In Jamaica, neighbourhood gangs operate in a symbiotic relationship with politicians for whom they can guarantee a majority of votes cast during elections (Figueroa and Figes, 2002). In return, they receive government contracts and political protection. In the 1970s, when government budgets were hit by structural adjustments, drastically reducing the scope politicians had for rewarding their supporters, Jamaican gangs had to diversify into other profitable operations (Harriott, 2000). These overlapped with wider geopolitical shifts placing drugs and drug policy right at the centre of regional development.

 

Geopolitical Rivalries in the Caribbean

During the Cold War, the region became a sideshow for superpower conflict. After the Cuban Revolution, the socialist turn of Guyana under Forbes Burnham in the mid-seventies, the popularity of social democracy in Jamaica, and the instalment of the New Jewel movement in Grenada, left-wing ideologies seemed to be on the advance across the region. In the early 1980s, a resurgent US government was anxious to roll back these gains, beginning with military intervention in Grenada. Internal disputes among the revolutionary leaders, resulting in a coup d’état and the execution of eight government officers, provided a pretext. In 1983, US and Caribbean troops fighting under the banner of the Regional Security System (RSS) invaded the island and defeated the Cuban trained revolutionaries.

The revival of US power was framed by the overlapping discourses on counterinsurgency and drug control. If the main theatres were Central America and Colombia, the repercussions were felt across the Caribbean region with thousands of miles of unprotected shoreline providing a transit zone and bases for forward operations. Law enforcement activity along direct importation routes displaced traffickers to places like the Bahamas. In the late 1970s, the Colombian cocaine trafficker Carlos Lehder turned Norman’s Cay into a transport hub, with cocaine shipments into Florida and Georgia. Reluctant at first, the Bahamian government of Lynden Pindling gave in to pressure from the US to crack down on smuggling and retake control of the island in 1982. It is reported that, in order to sway the Bahamian public against the new government policy, leaflets were dumped from a small plane circling over the Independence Day celebration in Clifford Park in Nassau. Calling for the expulsion of the US DEA, the leaflets had dollar bills attached to them (Smith, 2006).

With little experience in responding to organised crime and poorly resourced security services, Caribbean policy makers were growing alarmed. In 1990, the Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley warned “We are threatened by an international network of drug traffickers that has no precedent in history” (Payne, 1993).

These sentiments were echoed for the entire region by the influential report “A Time for Action” of the West India Commission, established by the CARICOM Heads of Government to help the people of the Commonwealth Caribbean prepare for the twenty-first century. Led by a senior judge, Sir Shridat Ramphal, it covered a wide range of issues affecting the region, but noted, “nothing poses a greater threat to civil society in CARICOM than the drug problem” (Ramphal, 1993). The findings were particularly alarming at a time when the end of the Cold War was shifting the attention of the Caribbean’s traditional donors to Eastern Europe. With the cessation of hostilities between different ideological camps, the strategic importance of the region as an “arch of democracy” also seemed to have diminished. Caribbean leaders therefore saw themselves as abandoned by traditional protectors and exposed to a new set of challenges (Griffith, 1997).

 

The Growing Role of Development Partners in Drug Control

To counter these threats, Caribbean governments decided to intensify internal cooperation, while at the same time securing external support. Caribbean anxieties over the security implications of an increasingly dynamic illicit drug trade coincided with geostrategic shifts and organisational requirements. The first such coincidence was the opening of the Barbados office of the United Nations Drug Control Program (UNDCP). The agency had been created out of UNDP in 1991 with a broad mandate and a small budget. It began to develop a role for itself acting as an intermediary between the external partners and the governments of the region, channelling requests for support from beneficiaries to donors. It also established itself as partner of Caribbean governments on issues around drug control and security policy.

The US maintained alternative diplomatic channels, both bi-laterally and multilaterally, through the OAS, and was prioritizing the involvement of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission/ La Comisión Interamericana para el Control del Abuso de Drogas (CICAD), founded in 1986. CICAD, like it’s parent body, the Organisation of American States (OAS), was and remains preoccupied with the often-acerbic relationship between the US and Latin American states. This focus on Latin America tended to marginalize countries of the English-speaking Caribbean and opened a niche for the other multilateral agency. US interests were therefore served by UNDCP (later to become the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODC) organising regional players around a single table, and by lending credence to the notion that these were negotiations between equal partners around common concerns.

One of the principle objectives of US Drug Control policy was to gain access for US naval vessels into the territorial waters of sovereign Caribbean states while “in hot pursuit” of drug traffickers. Negotiated on a country-by-country rather than a regional basis, the Agreement Concerning Co-operation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime Drug Trafficking, or the “Ship Rider Agreement,” allows the US Coast Guard or Navy to board and detain vessels inside territorial waters of Caribbean states on suspicion that they are committing a crime, which almost exclusively means drug trafficking (US State Department, 2005). A more comprehensive package of support measures for Caribbean law enforcement and security agencies was formalized with the 1997 Partnership for Prosperity and Security in the Caribbean (CARICOM, 1997). It allowed for the training of personnel, cooperation between US and Caribbean services, and the provision of equipment. The RSS was one of the main beneficiaries, securing patrol boats (and, more critically, fuel to allow the patrol boat to actually go on patrol), communications equipment, and surveillance planes.  The assurance of support and promises of hardware came with conditions. In Jamaica and St. Vincent, the leading cannabis producers in the region, the US revived crop eradication, providing equipment, logistics, and air support, and on occasion directly participating in the exercises. But there was no evidence that the farmers cultivating cannabis in the mountainous interior of the islands had any involvement with cocaine trafficking, or were posing a serious threat to government stability. By interpreting counter-trafficking policy in terms of cannabis control, Caribbean policymakers created tensions between the state and sections of the population. Repressive measures were applied in response to the concerned alarm voiced by Michael Manley and others over the power of drug-trafficking groups. But, in spite of highly publicized interceptions of cocaine shipments, the vast majority of law enforcement activity revolved around locally produced and consumed cannabis in each Caribbean island. In addition, because the predominant interest of external partners was in reducing the flow of illicit substances into the US and Europe by moving interdictions closer to the source of drugs, Caribbean states were prioritizing supply reduction over demand reduction. Indeed, for most parties involved, drug control is synonymous with repressive measures.

Interestingly, US military activity peaked at the very moment when law enforcement circles were reporting a decline in the significance of the Caribbean transit route for drugs entering the USA (Klein, 2001). Fluctuations in the volume of cocaine flowing through the Caribbean may be explained by various reasons. As military interdictions intensified in the Eastern and Central Caribbean, cocaine routes shifted west to Central America and the porous Mexican border. Also, the expansion of cocaine markets in Europe shifted trafficking through the OECS countries adjacent to Martinique and Guadeloupe, or Suriname and French Guyana, for onward shipment to Amsterdam and Paris. Some commentators have suggested that, regardless of outcome in terms of reducing drug availability in home markets, all US counter-narcotics measures were mainly a cover for expanding US influence in the hemisphere, At best, they were posited on a simplistic model according to which US drug problems were attributable to foreign suppliers (Bagley and Walker, 1994; Klein, Harriott and Day, 2004). More urgent, perhaps, was the situation of the US security sector during the funding trough between the Cold War and the Global War on Terror. During the 1990s, drugs became focus for, and legitimation of, maintaining an entire array of security forces. As a result, the threat emanating from Caribbean transit zones was overplayed to safeguard budgets. The change in priorities became clear in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in September 2001. Large numbers of US naval vessels were withdrawn from the Caribbean to patrol coastal waters of the US.

Caribbean overtures to external supporters coincided finally with a new phase in the emergence of an EU foreign policy. For years, the European Commission had worked parallel to the external relations of EU member states and identified development cooperation as an area where it could carve out an extensive role for itself. With drugs being redefined as a development issue in the 1990s, and in response to the requests from development beneficiaries, drug control became an issue it could engage with. The Caribbean was one of the beneficiaries, both because it had traditionally enjoyed high levels of European support, and because it was along the cocaine route.

In 1996, the European Commission committed itself to funding a substantial program agreed upon by the CARICOM member states and the principal external backers in the Barbados Plan of Action. Some 35 million European Currency Units[7] were allocated to a range of action to support the creation of drug councils, the drafting of Master Plans, the updating of legal provisions, the establishment of information coordination units, and training across an entire range of activities. In fact, the greatest single beneficiary of these actions was the UNDCP office in Barbados, which became the managing agency for most of these programs.

Momentum was therefore developing among donors and international agencies to support drug control in the Caribbean. For the US, the emphasis was clearly on interdicting the flow of cocaine towards the US by strengthening law enforcement and the security sector. To the EU, as well as key EU member states like the UK, France, and the Netherlands, who had historic links and a number of remaining territorial possessions there, supply reduction was also important. By approaching the issue in development terms, rather than as a war on drugs, the European support extended also to building up national control bureaucracies and demand reduction capacity. To that end, it used the intermediary services of the UNDCP, which used its strategic role and the inflow of funds to expand its own office and acquire regional significance.

 

The Impact of Drug Control at the National Level

By the early 2000s, then, the CARICOM Caribbean could draw on a web of relationship with US agencies; was receiving technical assistance from UNDCP, CICAD and a number of European agencies; and had an infrastructure of national and regional organizations focused on the control of illicit drugs. A small office had been established at the CARICOM secretariat to deal with drug issues on a regional level. There were national counterparts overseeing implementation and rolling out prevention and treatment. In Barbados, a team of five people was working on projects promoting health at the National Council on Substance Abuse. In Jamaica, the National Council on Drug Abuse was initiating community interventions, and in Port of Spain, the National Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention Program was supporting a network of drug treatment agencies, including one working exclusively with women. At the behest of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)[8] and the Mutual Evaluation Mechanism (MEM), overseen by CICAD, Caribbean countries acceded to the UN drug control conventions as well as the hemispheric drug control treaties. In many countries, treaty provisions were being incorporated into national legislation, with directives to law enforcement to prioritize drug offences, and legislative changes that raised penalties for drug offences sharply. Across CARICOM member states, drug control was comprehensively incorporated into the national and regional policy agenda within the space of a decade.

Yet, a number of trends were disturbing. In spite of the tough new measures, criminal activity continued to escalate, prompting CARICOM Heads of Government to establish an Inter-Governmental Task Force (IGTF) on Drugs and Crime in 2001. Available information on drug use prevalence, consisting of school surveys coordinated by the Caribbean Epidemiological Centre (CAREC) with EU funding and CICAD technical support, and the occasional rapid assessment studies supported by the UNODC, suggested that drug use was widespread and rising. There were popular perceptions of the link between drugs and crime, fuelled by lively media reports that chimed in with the experience of many ordinary people. But, increasingly, families had personal experience of problematic drug use; particularly as crack cocaine became more widely available across the islands. In 2002, in response, the Heads of Government decided that drugs were not simply a crime and security issue, but also a public health issue (CARICOM, 2002). This was public recognition that the region was not merely a transit zone for drugs, but also a growing market.

Yet, the headline figures concealed a number of important differences. First, the aggregation of data conceals considerable variance between individual countries. Reported consumption stood at 40% in Dominica and 33% in St. Lucia, but at only 12% in Suriname and 2% on Haiti (CICAD, 2012). Drug use in the form of cannabis consumption enjoys a high degree of social acceptance and is deeply embedded in cultural practice in Jamaica (Chevannes, 2004). In Barbados or Grenada, on the other hand, prevalence levels are significantly lower, use is frowned upon, and law enforcement agencies show low levels of tolerance.

The other important distinction is between the different substances circulating in Caribbean drug markets. MDMA, also called Ecstasy, and other amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) were found only rarely, usually imported from Europe, and used almost exclusively in holiday resorts. Heroin was as good as unknown, and the misuse of pharmaceutical substances was not widely reported. Herbal cannabis, on the other hand, mainly in the form of marijuana, often referred to as ganja, was ubiquitous, readily available, and cheap. Though local cultivation could be found in every country, the largest producers, according to the US INCSR, were Jamaica and St. Vincent:  “The archipelagic nation [St. Vincent] continues to be the source for the majority of cannabis in the region…  During 2011, government officials…eradicated 70 acres of marijuana, destroyed 1,696,021 plants, and seized 10.2 MT of cannabis.”  (US State Department, 2012).

Far less prevalent was cocaine, transported in its crystalline form and largely converted to a smokeable base commonly referred to as “crack.” Imported first to meet the demand from tourists, cocaine continues to be met with disapproval, including by many cannabis users (Broad and Feinberg, 1995). It has been widely decried as a “drug” and associated with the violence of the drug trade, the social deprivation of the homeless so visible around the markets and bus stations of Caribbean towns, and believed to be addictive. For many of the socially most vulnerable among the urban poor, but by no means all, crack has proven difficult. It is the main substance clients report problems with to the drug treatment centers like Patricia House in Kingston, Jamaica or New Life Ministries in Port of Spain. Mixed with cannabis into a “seasoned spliff,” it is used with the same mode of administration familiar from the culturally- sanctioned cannabis use. Ganja, by contrast, so runs a popular claim, is no drug at all, but a natural substance, an herb which can do no harm but holds the promise of “enlightenment,” and with a reference to biblical imagery, the “healing of the nation.”

The discussion is further nuanced by differences of class, race, and age. Interestingly, while migrants from the Indian subcontinent first introduced cannabis to the Caribbean (Mills, 2003), it now enjoys the greatest popularity among the population of the African Diaspora. In Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana, both countries with large populations of Indian extraction, the substance reported as most widely misused among Indian populations, incidentally, was alcohol.

In all countries, young people from all population groups were more likely to report having experience with cannabis, though findings are difficult to generalize given the preponderance of school studies and the lack of representation of youth “on the block.” A more accurate reflection of changing levels of use is perhaps the widespread level of indignation among older, conservative, largely female populations, reported in the media and given expression in the many community outreach meetings organized by drug councils. Once again, there are differences, as rural populations in Jamaica and Trinidad have old traditions of herbal remedies derived from cannabis, as well as of episodic recreational use. What has fundamentally changed the profile of Caribbean cannabis consumption, however, is Rastafarianism, with its emphatic endorsement of cannabis use as a religious sacrament.

Growing popularity of Rastafarianism in the Eastern Caribbean is paralleled, however, by the spread of evangelical Christianity, often with roots in the US. The social conservatism espoused by many Christians has been energized by the arrival of Pentecostal churches who have arguably re-connected communities with older traditions based on propriety, respect, and obedience. It has been said that Caribbean society is divided between different value sets striving alternatively for respectability: associated with work, church and family and reputation; associated with the street, hustling, and neighborhood (Littlewood, 1988).

 

Cannabis as an Economic Alternative in Rural and Urban Areas

 

With high levels of unemployment and low levels of economic diversification, the outlook for getting work in the formal sector looks bleak for most Caribbean males. Over the past decade, the opportunity structure has deteriorated sharply. Tighter restrictions on immigration to the US and UK have closed one of the classic responses by Caribbean men. Farmers in the Eastern Caribbean have been hit hard by changes to tariff structures that used to provide a niche for agricultural exports. The fruit, and especially bananas, grown on small holdings on the hillsides of small islands cannot compete on costs with so-called “dollar bananas” from South American plantations.  National Economic Research Associates (NERA) estimates that, in St. Vincent, income from banana exports dropped from 110,000 million Eastern Caribbean Dollars in 1990 to 30,000 million in 2004 (NERA, 2006). Farmers have, therefore, turned to alternatives, particularly cannabis. In an island with relatively little tourism and no other industries, an estimated 1,500 farmers had switched to cannabis by 2002. With cultivation running in excess of 3000 acres in the uplands around La Soufrière Volcano (Peak Consultants, 2002), illegal marijuana sales and exports account for close to a fifth of St. Vincent’s gross domestic product (Fineman, 2000). The industry has revitalized some rural areas where farmers invest earnings from cannabis sales in food, housing, and schooling for their families (Cottle, 2005).

Yet, these benefits come at a cost. Cannabis farming is now the biggest cause of deforestation on the island, with serious ecological repercussions. Topsoil, loosened by wind and rain, runs off into the river, accelerating sedimentation in the coral reefs surrounding the island. The trade itself causes spikes in crime after harvest periods, as transactions often lead to violence.

            In the neighboring island of St. Lucia, small-scale cannabis cultivation has coincided with a more dynamic cocaine trade, both for shipment onward and for sale to the local tourist market. Government policies have been far less tolerant, which translates into an aggressive policing style that intensifies the marginalization of these young men at the very point where economic alternatives are diminishing. Consequently, there is much distrust of the police by the community. Stigma from police contacts and pressure from their families are major contributory factors for the internal migration of young men into “cannabis friendly” squats, mostly located in what is commonly referred to as “de ghetto.” In spite of rigorous law enforcement, including regular eradication exercises, the cannabis supply is steady. During the 2012 winter holidays, just after the eradication of two large plantations with over 8,000 plants, cannabis sellers responded by offering their customers a “Christmas bonus.” Twice the amount for the usual cost, effectively slashing prices by half.

The consequences of cannabis policing in countries with embedded cultures of use are reflected in the prison populations. In Saint Lucia in 2012, lifetime prevalence of marijuana use by first time offenders (remand or convicted) was revealed to be 76.5%.  For the recidivists (remand or convicted), the lifetime prevalence of marijuana use was 85.7%. Regardless of any harms or benefits that may or may not be attributable to cannabis use, just the mere act of using cannabis in an environment of strict cannabis law enforcement contributes to the growth of a pool of young men whose initial exposure to criminality was their public use of cannabis. The profile of the participants of this prison study is representational of the same underclass of marginalized, undereducated young men at the focus of this report (Day, 2013).

• 7% of the prisoners surveyed fall in the age group 16 – 35,
• 31% never completed primary school, and an additional
• 44% never completed secondary school.

 

Caribbean Dilemmas

            In response to the existential threat posed by international drug cartels, and under pressure from hegemonic development partners, Caribbean governments have adopted drug control policies in pursuit of greater security and in compliance with the demands of international partners. The problem for them has been that international anxiety over the cocaine trade through the region coincided with an increase in the regional production and use of cannabis. Both substances were controlled under international conventions, and the policies and programs arrived at by regional agreements with a view of interdicting the trans-continental cocaine traffic, such as the Barbados Plan of Action, are now targeting local cannabis users. As a consequence, this has put a heavy strain on the relationship between the state and the community, particularly between the police and the young men. It is absorbing a rising share of government expenditure and has led to the congestion of courts and prisons.

The capacity of the courts to hear cases, the majority of which, in some jurisdictions, are drug-related, is limited. As most of the defendants are poor, they struggle to raise funds even where bail is granted. An increase in the number of pre-trial detainees, combined with a growing number of convictions, has driven up imprisonment rates across the region. As a result, Caribbean prisons are overcrowded and countries in the region have some of the highest rates of imprisonment in the world (Day, 2013).

Figure 1: Selected OECS countries, Barbados and the Dominican Republic prison populations in 2010

Country	Prison population (2010)	Imprisonment rate[9] (2010)	Prison capacity	Prison occupancy level
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	395	326	Kingstown Prison: 150 Fort Charlotte Women’s Prison: 50	197.5%
St. Lucia	564	322	Bordelais Correctional Facility:  450[10]	125%
St. Kitts and Nevis	269	531	Basseterre Prison; 150 Nevis Prison Farm: 26	152%
Barbados	914	320	Dodds Prison: 1250	73%
Dominican Republic	20,500	202	Not available	Not available

Source: Atabay, 2010

 

Efforts have been made over the past 10 years to mitigate the worst effects of incarceration by providing non-custodial alternatives to non-violent offenders. Antigua, St. Lucia, Grenada, and Dominica have set up probation services and community service programs with support from the UK Department for International Development. Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago have set up drug courts. Laudable in themselves, such programs have proven inadequate for stemming the criminalization of young men, the burden on the overstretched criminal justice system, and to mitigate the continuing tension between government policies and large sections of the community. The continuing application of repressive drug control measures is therefore driving the growth in the prison population. Once stigmatized with a criminal record, offenders will be excluded from employment markets and become repeat offenders. According to one report, the “high level of criminalisation … due to the harsh measures adopted against drug use and possession” has raised a need “for comprehensive interventions, including reforming legislation, providing support to drug demand reduction programmes and drug treatment centres in the community and prisons, training for staff, and the development of effective mechanisms of cooperation between criminal justice institutions and treatment centres” (Ataby, 2010).

 

 

New Approaches to Drugs and Crime in the CARICOM Caribbean: Transnational Policing and Policy Reform

Efforts to develop the cooperation and coordination of law enforcement agencies across the region resulted in the formation of the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS), with headquarters in Port of Spain. Supported by CARICOM member states, the EU and US, it has helped set up an Air Passenger Information System, is running a Joint Regional Communication Centre, and is working on the Caribbean Arrest Warrant. There are training exercises and projects for sharing ballistic and forensic capacity between member states. In addition to vibrant formal partnerships between police, customs, armed forces, coast guards, and the liaison officers of international agencies such as the US Drug Enforcement Administration of the UK National Crime Agency, there are old boys’ networks and personal contacts. These activities taking place under the rubric of “transnational policing” have transformed law enforcement in the Caribbean, facilitating large drug seizures and high profile arrests, but do not seem to have made it any safer (Bowling, 2009). Against this background of rising costs and diminishing benefits, come the recent discussions by CARICOM leaders to change the policy paradigm.  On a regional level, the debate on the status of cannabis was opened on September 2, 2013 by St. Vincent and the Grenadines’ Prime Minister Dr. Ralph Gonsalves, who called to then CARICOM Chair, Trinidad and Tobago’s Prime Minister, Kamla Persad Bissessar, for a “reasoned debate” on the issue of cannabis by the Heads of Government of CARICOM.   Gonsalves wrote, “the longer we wait to give serious regional consideration to this subject, the further behind we would lag in the inevitable legislation of medical marijuana globally. In the end, our Caribbean would consume the medical/health, cosmetic and other products derived from marijuana, legally grown and produced, in the USA” (Richards, 2013).

PM Persad Bissessar is quoted as making special note that no decision has been reached with this issue. “The decision is no decision on that issue (decriminalising marijuana) except to say, much further discussions, much more consultations in each other country will take place before a report is presented in February next year,” at the next Heads Summit (Richards, 2013).

Gonsalves made reference to noted Caribbean scientist Dr. Henry Lowe’s influence in favour of the legitimate utilisation of marijuana products for a range of medical and health purposes, He said Lowe’s work shows that “the marijuana plant has a bundle of proven and potentially beneficial uses.” Antigua and Barbuda’s Prime Minister Baldwin Spencer said it made no sense shying away from the debate on the matter. “I certainly would court …looking at this issue in a real serious way and to be able to move towards doing something that could be beneficial to society and that’s the important thing. If it means we have to look at this marijuana medicinal value of it and it can shape something that is beneficial for medicinal purposes, I don’t think that this is something we should just frown upon” (Richards, 2013).

Trinidad and Tobago’s Chief Justice voiced the judiciary’s opinion at the start of the new law term in September 2013, when he suggested that decriminalising simple marijuana possession would allow the court to focus on more serious crimes. “This is not a moral judgment, although one might observe that marijuana consumption probably wreaks no more havoc than alcohol addiction, but we provide support for one and punishment for the other,” he said, noting that “the consensus about many of the assumptions about the effects of marijuana in particular is unravelling. So much so that CNN’s Dr Sanjay Gupta recently publicly changed his stance on the issue,” he told assembled judges. Trinidad and Tobago’s Attorney General, Anand Ramlogan, is quoted as saying the coalition government would welcome a healthy debate on the need to legalise marijuana, and that the Chief Justice was “clearly thinking outside the box” (Richards, 2013).

 

Conclusions

The price of crack has not moved in 30 years. In Castries, St. Lucia, a single rock was selling for 5 OECS dollars and for 5 Trinidad and Tobago dollars in Port of Spain. In early 2014, the same prices hold, probably the only commodity whose cost had not doubled or tripled in that same period. And, $5.00 no longer purchases what $5.00 purchased in 1984. Despite the investments in supply control and the high human cost that entails, the cost of crack is half the cost of what it was in 1984. Over the same period, the expansion of the criminal justice system¾meaning police, courts and prisons¾has been accompanied by a sharp rise in violent crime. Homicide rates in Jamaica rose from 145 in 1971 to 1680 in 2009. According to a study by the United Nations, three Caribbean countries (Belize, Jamaica, and St. Kits and Nevis) were among the top 10 countries most afflicted by violence (UN, 2013). The failure of repressive approaches in eliminating drugs and drug use is apparent to people across the political spectrum, and has opened new opportunities for debate. When exploring alternative policies, the political constraints of highly dependent small island states, vulnerable to the depredations of organized crime, have to be factored in. It is unlikely that Caribbean states, either on their own or under the auspices of CARICOM, will deviate from international policy norms. But, they may come to support the movement for change, and they may reform their domestic management of drugs and drug issues. There is certainly an opportunity for including Caribbean nations in the reform initiatives gathering pace in Latin America; however, efforts have to be made on both sides.

 

 

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[1] Lecturer in the Anthropology of Conflict, Criminal Justice and Policy, University of Kent, UK. Email: a.klein@kent.ac.uk

[2] Director of the Caribbean Drug Abuse Research Institute. Email: marcus.p.day@gmail.com

[3] British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands retain their colonial status as UK Overseas Territories

[4]  Chaguaramas Development Authority, The Treaty of Chaguaramas, accessed on November 30, 2014 at http://www.chagdev.com/History/ChaguaramasHistory/TheTreatyofChaguaramas.aspx

[5] The application for CARICOM membership by the Dominican Republic was suspended after a ruling by the Dominican Supreme Court denied citizenship to those born of non-Dominican parents deemed to be in transit. This ruling was back dated to 1929 and impacts on virtually all children of the Haitian diaspora (Rojas, 2014).

[6] The System acquired Treaty status in March 1996 when the RSS Treaty was signed at St. Georges, Grenada

[7] Precursor to the Euro

[8] UNDCP was renamed following a scandal about financial misallocation under its head Pinot Arlacchi.

[9] Measured as per 100,000 of the national population.

[10] Excluding accommodation for 25 in the Segregation Unit and for 25 in the Medical Unit.

 

Summary of the Text’s Core Arguments

The paper presents a critical analysis of drug policy in the Caribbean, arguing that it is a system largely imposed by external powers (primarily the US) to address their own drug consumption problems (cocaine trafficking). This external imposition has led to several critical problems for Caribbean nations:

1. Misaligned Priorities: The focus on supply reduction and interdiction of cocaine has led law enforcement to disproportionately target local cannabis users, growers, and traders. This is a significant source of social tension, as cannabis is culturally embedded in many Caribbean societies, particularly in Jamaica.

2. Erosion of State Legitimacy and Capacity: The “war on drugs” has placed an immense burden on already limited national resources. It has led to overcrowded prisons, overburdened courts, and a criminalization of a large segment of the population (especially marginalized young men), which in turn fosters distrust in the state and its institutions. The corruption of officials by drug traffickers further undermines state legitimacy.

3. Sovereignty and Dependency: Caribbean states are shown to be highly dependent on foreign aid and goodwill, making them vulnerable to pressure from donor nations. This was starkly illustrated when the US ambassador quashed Jamaica’s 2004 Ganja Commission recommendations.

4. The Hypocrisy of Cannabis Policy: The text highlights the stark contrast between the government’s repressive policies and the social reality of widespread cannabis use. This policy is seen as a colonial relic that criminalizes cultural practices.

5. Policy Failure: Despite decades of repressive policies and massive investment, the drug trade and violence have not declined. The price of crack cocaine has remained stable for 30 years, and homicide rates have skyrocketed, demonstrating the abject failure of the current approach.

6. Geopolitical and Bureaucratic Interests: The policies are not just about drugs; they serve the geopolitical interests of the US (maintaining regional influence) and the bureaucratic interests of international agencies (like the UNODC) and domestic security sectors, which have come to rely on the funding and rationale provided by the drug war.

Opinion

The text makes a compelling and, in my view, undeniable case that the current drug policy framework in the CARICOM Caribbean is a profound failure. It is not merely ineffective; it is actively harmful. The policy has created a self-perpetuating cycle: external pressure mandates a repressive response, which leads to the criminalization of citizens, which fuels distrust and violence, which “proves” the need for more repression. This cycle benefits everyone except the Caribbean people and their governments.

My opinion is that the central problem is the subordination of Caribbean national interests and public health to the geopolitical and bureaucratic demands of external actors. The policy is designed from the outside and for the outside—to stop drugs from reaching the US and Europe. The “collateral damage” of this policy, which includes social fragmentation, mass incarceration, and the erosion of the rule of law, is borne entirely by Caribbean societies. The reliance on a 20th-century prohibitionist framework is a failure for a 21st-century region.

Here are the key points that form the basis of my opinion:

1. A Public Health and Social Justice Issue, Not Just a Security Issue:
The text shows that drug use, especially cannabis, is a social and public health reality. By treating it solely as a security issue, the state is using a blunt instrument to solve a complex social phenomenon. The criminalization approach creates a class of “criminals” out of people who are essentially exercising a culturally ingrained practice. This is unjust and socially destructive. The fact that cannabis is no more harmful than alcohol, as noted by Trinidad’s Chief Justice, is a critical point that underscores the irrationality of the policy. The decriminalization of cannabis should be a public health and human rights imperative, not just a policy debate.

2. The Failure is the Foundation for Reform:
The complete failure of the policy to achieve its stated goals—reducing drug availability and violence—is the most powerful argument for change. When a policy is not only failing but also causing immense harm, maintaining it is not just illogical; it is negligent. The empirical evidence presented in the text (stable crack prices, rising homicide rates, overflowing prisons) provides a clear mandate for a new approach. The “opportunity for including Caribbean nations in the reform initiatives gathering pace in Latin America” (as mentioned in the conclusion) is a vital step.

3. The Path Forward: Pragmatism and Regional Autonomy:
While the text acknowledges the political and economic constraints on Caribbean states, it also highlights a growing regional momentum for change. The debate initiated by leaders like Ralph Gonsalves is crucial. The reform path should be pragmatically focused on two core elements:

• Domestic Decriminalization and Regulation: The first step is to align the law with social reality. Decriminalizing cannabis for personal use and exploring a regulated market for medical and possibly recreational use would immediately reduce the prison population, free up law enforcement resources, and provide new economic opportunities. This would acknowledge and legitimize an already-existing parallel economy, reducing the power of criminal gangs.

• Prioritizing Public Health: Resources saved from policing cannabis should be re-invested in evidence-based public health campaigns, harm reduction, and accessible treatment for problematic drug use (e.g., with crack cocaine). This would treat drug use as a health issue, reducing the stigma associated with it and providing genuine help to those who need it.

4. Challenging the External “Partnership”:
While cooperation with the US and EU is a reality, the nature of the “partnership” must be fundamentally renegotiated. Caribbean governments must assert their sovereignty and demand that drug policy be aligned with their national needs and priorities. This means ending the practice of being penalized (e.g., through “narcotics certification”) for pursuing policies that are in their own best interests. The “Ship Rider Agreement” and other such treaties should be reviewed to ensure they truly serve regional security and not just US foreign policy objectives.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the evidence in this text points to one clear conclusion: the current drug policy in the CARICOM Caribbean is an unsustainable, externally-imposed failure that is harming the very societies it purports to protect. The path forward lies in a pragmatic, health-focused, and humane reform that puts the well-being of Caribbean citizens at its center. This requires Caribbean leaders to capitalize on the growing regional and international momentum for change, challenge the subordination of their sovereignty to external interests, and build a drug policy that is effective, just, and sustainable for the 21st century.